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BOOKS REVIEWED
The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order. By Richard
A. Falk. Foreword by Richard B. Lillich. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press.
1964. Pp. xvi, 1S4. $6.50.
In this skillful, passionate study of the present and potential role of domestic
courts in developing international law and in aiding in the development of a sounder
international legal order, Professor Falk challenges "the contemporary tendency to
give foreign policy precedence over international law in domestic courts."' While
perhaps somewhat less "radical" than he purports to be, his inquiry nevertheless is
both perceptive and refreshing in its approach to that holy of holies, the act of state
doctrine. The bulk of the book is devoted to this currently much debated area but
in a way which permits a good deal of light to be shed on the general problems of
building a legal order in a world of sovereign, self-defending national states. One
of the virtues of Professor Falk's writing is that he moves systematically into and

through his materials. In reviewing his approach, a similar building process is in order.
At the outset, Professor Falk rejects the notion that a legal scholar has no duty
towards identifying, where possible, what the law should be. This to him must of
course flow not from some claims to special access to truth but rather from a
scrupulous evaluation of the state of the law and of the character of the social system
within which the law is expected to function. Recognizing the utility of the positivists'
approach in restricting the province of law to the restraints generally accepted as
operative in state behaviour, and the tendency of all scholars to smuggle their own
views into an analysis disguised as "facts," he nevertheless insists on the need for
social observation rather than formal rules "as the method by which to specify the
scope of operative restraints upon national behavior "' and on the scholar's ability,
once he carefully identifies his own biases and approach, to prescribe for demonstrable ills.
Surveying the divided world and its decentralized divided law, Professor Falk
stresses a limited form of "judicial deference" for national courts as the policy most
likely to promote the growth of the international legal order except in two vitally
important major cases: where "the subject matter of dispute is governed by substantive norms of international law that are adhered to by an overwhelming majority
of international actors"-3 and where judicial deference to executive authority is not
achieved "by sacrificing judicial independence." 1 This latter is inevitably bound to
be a touchy matter. The objectives of deference, to Falk, are to take what are really
not properly litigable cases from the courts and give them to the more flexible
executive while asserting the independence of the courts from the need to make
narrow, foreign policy oriented decisions where there is a true international consensus. National courts, by deferring where proper and by deciding in accordance
with an existing international consensus (even if their own state does not officially
share the view) where proper, thus become effectively "international institutions of
restricted competence." 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Falk, The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order 4 n.S.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
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In his discourse, Falk first comments on the present role of states and the "functional obsolescence" of the state system. He moves on to an analysis of international
jurisdiction from the perspective of an independent state. He seeks the elements
constituting the international legal order through an analysis rather than a description of the extent of the legal competence possessed by a state. In describing international jurisdiction and horizontal and vertical conceptions of legal order, his debt
to Myres McDougal is patent and is acknowledged. Falk finds little to prevent extending the conception of law to the horizontal pattern of order which is typical of
the international system. This pattern naturally favors self-delimitation based on
reciprocity and feasibility. Lacking centralized authority, a horizontal system stresses
cooperation and is keyed on executive and judicial self-restraint. The existence of
contending systems of public order is also briefly noted and described as is the fact
that their existence has an effect as well on jurisdictional situations. Falk's discussion of this point is brief and, in his words, tentative. It is an area of the study
that one might ask to have expanded and, in places, clarified by expansion.
In his fifth chapter (first written in 1961), the heart of the book, Professor Falk
states the case for his view of the "optimum participation of domestic courts in the
international legal order."0 The trial court's opinion in Banco Nacional do Cuba v.
Sabbatino,7 is the take-off point for his critique though it serves rather as the "scaffolding for a theory"8 than as a case study alone. In brief, in the decentralized international legal system we have today, with nuclear weapons, the cold war and divergent
systems of public order to contend with, Falk suggests that powerful states must
restrain their conduct to reasonable limits even when no prohibitive legal rule exists.
Domestic courts, for their part, must recognize where systems diverge as well as
where worldwide consensus happens to exist. Where legitimate divergence exists,
where national courts will tend to be biased in favor of their own views of right, in
Falk's view the courts should defer to the executive where a frankly political approach
can be made. Rather than review Sabbatino at this date, it is perhaps enough to state
Falk's criticisms of the district court decision: that the BernsteinO precedent was
misused so as to allow intergovernmental hostility to influence the court's scope of
inquiry; that the court went beyond former decisions in disregarding foreign governmental acts, such a rejection always formerly depending on a State Department
mandate or a factor such as nonrecognition or extraterritoriality; and that inquiry
should be permissible not merely if it fails to embarrass the executive but only if the
executive directs it. Sabbatino, Falk states, "gives internal judicial implementation
to political pressures."' 1 Falk seeks to discourage judicial activism, as here, in
"areas of legitimate diversity."" The Department of State in its brief amicus before
the Supreme Court to a limited extent, and Mr. Justice Harlan, writing for the
Court in its decision' 2 reversing the district and circuit courts, reflect the approach
advocated by Professor Falk.
6. Id. at 64.
7. 193 F. Supp. 375 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd, 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962), rev'd, 376 Us.
398 (1964).
8. Falk, op. cit. supra note 1, at 64.
9. Bernstein v. Van Heyghen Freres Societe Anonyme, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 332 U.S. 772 (1947).

10. Falk, op. cit. supra note 1, at 96.
11.
12.

Id. at 113.
376 U.S. 398 (1964).

1965]

BOOK REVIEWS

535

As a matter of interest, Congress has itself taken up the issue of Sabbttno. In an
amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1964, approved October 7, 1964, Congress
tried its hand in moving the courts to follow the district court's approach, or at least
to make the State Department act formally in each case. Section 301(d) (4) provides:
Notvithstanding any other provision of law, no court in the United States -hall
decline on the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination
on the merits giving effect to the principles of international law in a case in vwhich
a claim of title or other right is asserted by any party including a foreign state (or
a party claiming through such state) based upon (or traced through) a confiscation
or other taking after January 1, 1959, by an act of that state in violation of the
principles of international law, including the principles of compensation and the
other standards set out in this subsection: Providcd, That this subparagraph shall
not be applicable (1) in any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary
to international law or vith respect to a claim of title or other right acquired pursuant to an irrevocable letter of credit of not more than 1S0 days duration issued
in good faith prior to the time of the confiscation or other taking, or (2) in any case
with respect to which the President determines that application of the act of state
doctrine is required in that particular case by the foreign policy interests of the
United States and a suggestion to this effect is filed on his behalf in that case vith
the court, or (3) in any case in which the proceedings are commenced after January 1, 1966.13
At this writing, no court has as yet passed on the effect of this section.
The remaining two chapters deal at some length vith the circuit court's opinion in
Sabbatino,14 Sabbatino and the Draft Restatement on Foreign Relations, the United
States' brief amicus in Sabbatino and, at greater length, vith the issue of "sovereign
immunity" in the world today. His plea here again is for the courts to free themselves from self-imposed subservience to the executive, to refuse to play dead simply
because the executive chooses to act and to adopt "the policy of extending law to
cover in an orderly and a just fashion as many controversies involving international
law as possible."' His comments on sovereign immunity, which, to him, lacks an
adequate functional justification, warrant the reader's close attention.
Falk is biased; he says so and proves it. In a nuclear armed vorld, he sees no
alternative to catastrophe in anything but a gradual substitution of global loyalties
for national loyalties. This for him requires that national courts be willing to accept
as a rule an effective consensus even if their own executive is displeased. This specifically requires that courts in the United States, the most powerful law-oriented nation,
take special care to follow an international consensus, or to act appropriately if there
is none, regardless of the momentary vagaries of American foreign policy. Fall: recognizes that courts in totalitarian states are not similarly free but rejects this as a reason
for blind U.S. judicial deference, prayerfully rather than naively. While less convinced than he of the creative importance of the role of domestic courts in the development of a viable, democratic order, this reviewer must confess that he shares
the author's bias towards increased techniques of international accommodation. Of
more technical importance perhaps, the book is e-xciting and offers many fresh insights
in what is at this time a lively area of controversy in international law. For his
review of the Sabbatino case alone, Professor Falk demands reading; his admirers
13. 22 U.S.CA. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. 1964).
14. 307 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1962).
15. Falk, op. cit. supra note 1, at 167.
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and detractors will form small but vigorous armies. What more need be said
about an author who "intends to be radical"?
HowARD J. TAUBENFELD*

Financing a Theatrical Production: A Symposium of the Committee on the
Law of the Theatre of the Federal Bar Association of New York, New
Jersey and Connecticut. Edited by Joseph Taubman. New York: Federal Legal
Publications, Inc. 1964. Pp. xxiv, 499. $15.00.
This Business of Music. By Sidney Shemel and M. William Krasilovsky. Edited
by Paul Ackerman. New York: Billboard Publishing Company. 1964. Pp. xxvi, 426.

$12.50.
My curse on plays
That have to be set up in fifty ways,
On the day's war with every knave and dolt,
Theatre business, management of men.-W. B. Yeats'
In my experience, the S.E.C. is nothing more than * * * red tape, delays, more
delays, nuisance and cost. And to what purpose? Who is being protected, and from
what? Certainly, the honesty of the producer is not guaranteed by these official
requirements; if the producer turns out to be2 less than honest, the investor has not
been protected from him.-Herman Shumlin
Maybe things at the Abbey weren't so bad after all. As a producer Yeats could
deal with erudite politicians like Douglas Hyde, relatively undemanding benefactresses
like Lady Gregory, and unobtrusive writers like J.M. Synge.8 There were certain
unmistakable fringe benefits: Playboy of the Western World touched off a series of
"spontaneous demonstrations"; and The Countess Cathleen, depending upon the
censor, was denounced as anti-Irish, anti-Christian, or both. But for all this fun the
Irish National Theatre for years seemed about as likely to make money as the
New Haven Railroad. Unlike the New Haven's staggering annual deficits, the
Abbey's amounted to only a few hundred shillings at most. The penury of Yeats's
theatre, like the poverty of the 1840's, was small potatoes.
In the quarter-century since Yeats's death the world has grown wealthier and
more sophisticated. "Art for art's sake" is hardly a fashionable slogan today. I sometimes find it hard to suppress the giggles at the image of Yeats's old lovers, each
well up in the sixties, meeting for the first time in more than twenty years, to
"descant and yet again descant/ Upon the supreme theme of Art and Song.' 4 Now
the supreme themes in "art" and "song" seem to be the preservation and exploitation
of copyrights, mechanical rights, subsidiary rights, synchronization rights, and a host
*

Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University School of Law.

1. Yeats, Collected Poems: Definitive Edition 91 (1956).
2. Letter to Bernard A. Grossman, Sept. 8, 1962, in Financing a Theatrical Production
489 (Taubman ed. 1964). The asterisks appear in the printed text and may indicate the
deletion of an adjective or two.
3. For all their other virtues, Hyde and Lady Gregory were not unobtrusive as playwrights. But then, neither was Yeats.
4. Yeats, op. cit. supra note 1, at 260.
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of other rights that have, quite plainly, nothing to do with the old-fashioned question
of whether something seems to be "right" aesthetically.
With civilization's progress, the "knave and dolt" of vwhom Yeats complained are
identifiable in a bowl of alphabet soup. There's AFTRA, for example, and AGAC. and
AGVA, and ASCAP,5 and on and on and on. For producer Herman Shumlin, one
gathers, the chief dolt is the SEC.
Mr. Shumlin's feelings about the Securities and Exchange Commission do not
seem to have been shared by most of the participants in the Federal Bar Association's
symposium on theatrical financing. There is, for the most part, agreement that nice
people conform with certain bothersome mandates of federal and state legislation.
Although one lawyer speaks wittily of "the connection between the S.E.C. and . . .
Jack Gelber" 6 and another describes a rational scheme for inducing vwealthy ladies
to invest in repertory theatre,7 most of the writers seem unwilling to indulge themselves in the fancy that the theatre is or ought to be anything more than commercial
enterprise. The symposium was not of course concerned with aesthetic problems, and
all that the reader may legitimately expect is a hardheaded discussion of legal and
quasi-legal issues by specialists in a fairly arcane branch of law.
That expectation. I am sorry to say, is dashed. Symposia are primarily convivial
occasions, and the Federal Bar Association's shindig seems to have been no exception
to this rule. The book that resulted therefrom exudes the same kind of stickiness
that one usually associates with charitable fund-raising dinners. Nothing is left out.
In place of the customary postprandially affable toastmaster there is an editor whose
main function seems to have been the arrangement of the text into prologue, five acts,
entr'acte and epilogue. There is even the presentation, in what I taLke to be Latin,
of an award to a distinguished citizen.
Apart from this feeling of chumminess, Financinga TheatricalProductin has little
to offer. The writers chat more or less autobiographically about their experiences v.ith
the SEC; one lawyer says that his form of limited partnership agreement is better
than another's; government officials say that the government loves everybody; and
certain well-known facts about the infant mortality of Broadway plays are presented.
The symposium participants have contributed to the commercial theatre of New
York, and it would be unkind to deny them the right to engage in amateur theatricals
on their own.
A far less genteel production is This Business of Music. In their "practical guide"
Messrs. Shemel and Krasilovsky have set themselves a formidable task: explaining
and tying together the incredibly complex sets of relationships that make up the
"music industry" in such a way as to enable readers of varying degrees of legal
sophistication to obtain a working understanding of the problems involved. There is
no cant, no ritual bow to Art, for even the most tolerant cultural relativist vould
be hard pressed to find anything of merit in the Beatles. Music, we learn, is the
5. The several sets of initials refer to American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists; American Guild of Authors and Composers; American Guild of Variety Artists;
and American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers.
6. J. T. Sullivan, S.E.C. Practice and Procedure, in Financing a Theatrical Production,
op. cit. supra note 2, at 159.
7. A. U. Schwartz, Some Thoughts on New Methods of Theatrical Investment, in Financing a Theatrical Production, op. cit. supra note 2, at 415.
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business of marketing sound; the authors are conducting a course in business administration and not in the humanities.
They range over pretty much the whole of the music business, giving detailed and
satisfying accounts of matters, like the policies of the major performing rights
organizations (ASCAP and BMI) and various industry practices, that I used to
think of as hopelessly incomprehensible. For the first time I find myself able to
understand (I think) the complex of interrelationships among the various segments
of the crazy network that comprises the music industry.
This benefit is, however, to some degree impaired by the total absence of documentation in the authors' discussion of legal problems. The discovery of a few
howlers in the text s gives rise to this niggling question: Just how reliable is the book
when it discusses legal questions rather than the denizens and mores of Tin Pan
Alley? I would guess that it is highly reliable, but wish I could be more sure.
I half suspect that the book's editor, who is also the music editor of Billboard,
prevailed upon the authors to eliminate from their manuscript the documentation
of authority that so delights a lawyer's soul 9 in the belief that sales would be
stimulated thereby. If this be the case, I hope the first edition sells out quickly and
that the second edition restores the deleted material.
JEROME S. RUBENSTEIN*

8. Shemel and Krasilovsky say, for example, "a poem is not copyrightable unless
published in a book .

. . ."

This Business of Music 73 (1964). Even if the authors mean

that registration of a claim to copyright in a poem cannot be made until the work has
been published in a book, the statement is patently incorrect. Who can doubt that a valid
copyright may be obtained and registered in a poem disseminated, as a "broadside," on
a single sheet of paper?
Interesting noncopyright questions are frequently ignored by the authors. Their standard
form of agreement between recording artist and record company contains the following
provision: "The artist represents that (s)he is, or within thirty (30) days from the date
of this agreement will become, a member of the American Federation of Television and
Radio Artists in good standing." Id. at 403. The provision would seem, at first blush,
violative of section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29
U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1958), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (Supp. V, 1964), but It
may be that the authors know of some ruling to the contrary.
9. Compare 33 Fordham L. Rev. 125, 127 n.9 (1964).
* Member of the New York Bar.

